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11 Introduction
Computational agents situated in a shared environment can coordinate their actions
through communication. However, what exactly the agents should communicate to
each other is not always known in advance to the programmer. In this case it would
be useful, if the agents could independently adapt their communication to fit their
needs.
In this thesis the agents’ communication method is a language, that emerges in
the agent society through the agents’ experiences and social interaction. The lan-
guage consists only of individual words, that refer to certain meanings. There is no
grammar and the agents don’t construct sentences.
The meanings are such that they can be used to refer to certain objects in the agent’s
environment. Suppose for example that the agents are in an environment with two
blue objects and one red object. If an agent wants to draw the attention of the other
agents to the red object, it can do so by communicating the meaning "red".
Even though the language in this thesis is quite simple, its emergence is complex,
because the agents learn individually. Each agent has its own meaning structure and
lexicon, which have been learned through personal experience and are not directly
accessible to other agents. The agents can infer what others mean by certain words
only from the context the words are used in. Quine’s example [1] of a linguist
translating a new language illustrates the difficulty of such a task. The linguist is
in the company of a native speaker, when a rabbit scurries by and the native says
"Gavagai". The linguist cannot directly infer what "Gavagai" means, because there
are several possible interpretations including "animal", "rabbit" and the colour of
this particular animal (e.g. "white").
One of the greatest advantages computational agents have over humans is that they
can directly transmit information to each other without having to encode and de-
code it through language. In humans this would correspond to a person sending
her thoughts to another person via some kind of telepathy. Even among computa-
tional agents there are some situations where this is not possible. First, the internal
representation of information might be too large to transmit if the agents have a
limited bandwidth for communication. Second, the agents might have been imple-
mented differently, so that they can’t understand the information representations
of each other. Third, there might be a need for the computational agents to work
alongside humans, obviously making direct transmissions impossible with current
2technology. In these cases communication might become possible if the information
is represented as meanings with words linked to them. When an agent wants to
communicate a meaning, it can just transmit the word linked to it, for example, by
saying the word out loud.
In this thesis a language is deemed practical if it helps its users in achieving their
goals. Thus what kind of meanings the language should be able to convey is de-
pendant on the agents’ goals. For a group of robots exploring a maze, meanings for
directions, different kinds of junctions, and dead end might be useful. If the robots
are instead playing soccer, meanings for defending, attacking, and passing might
come in handy.
In recent years practical language emergence has been studied utilising neural net-
works [2, 3, 4]. Neural networks have several drawbacks, including their slow conver-
gence and black box nature. In contrast simpler, explicit language models learned
through language games are used in this thesis.
Language games provide the agents with a framework for language learning and
usage, including a script to follow in their verbal communications. An example of a
language game is the Guessing Game [5]. The Guessing Game has two participants:
the speaker and the hearer. The speaker chooses a topic for the game, which might
for instance be an object or another agent, and verbally describes it. The hearer,
based on the verbal description, tries to infer the topic and indicates its guess to
the speaker for example by pointing. If the hearer guessed correctly, the game
succeeds. Otherwise the game fails. The agents can update their lexicons based on
the outcome of the game.
Previous research on language games has focused on how a language might emerge
and how different mechanisms affect the emergence. The agents’ goal in these studies
has been to learn a language in order to succeed in the language games they play.
The agents have not had goals outside of the language games.
Diverging from previous research, the aim of this thesis is to lay some groundwork
for research on language games grounded in practicality. The problem is approached
with the following research question:
How might language games be grounded in practicality?
This means that it isn’t enough for the agents in this thesis to be good only in
3language games. They also have to be able to utilise the language as they act in
an environment. This raises questions like when and how the agents should com-
municate. Although these could be learned, in this thesis they are predetermined.
Instead the agents learn what is communicated, i.e. which meanings they try to
communicate to each other in the language games.
The research question is approached both on a conceptual level and through empiri-
cal computer simulations. On a conceptual level the problem of grounding language
in practicality is described generally and different properties of agents that make
practicality grounding possible are introduced. To test and analyse an example im-
plementation of these properties, an experiment is devised where agents fetch items
in a simulated warehouse environment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses grounding language
in perception, which serves as the problem setting for this thesis. The contributions
of this thesis begin in Section 3, where the problem of grounding language in percep-
tion is extended to include grounding in practicality. Some abilities for the agents
are also suggested to make grounding in practicality possible. Section 4 describes
the experiment setting for the computer simulation experiments. The implemen-
tation of the simulations is detailed before the agents have any language abilities.
Section 5 reports results from experiments where the agents act without language,
establishing a baseline. In Section 6 the agents are endowed with the ability to
use language. For this two new language games are introduced, which are used to
conduct experiments to see if a practical language emerges in the agent society. In
Section 7 different properties of the language are investigated further through em-
pirical experimentation. Section 8 discusses related work. Finally Section 9 ends
the thesis with conclusions and future work.
A paper summarising the work presented in this thesis has been published in the
proceedings of AISB 2019 [6].
2 Grounding language in perception
In this thesis each agent has its own internal meanings and a lexicon that associates
words with them. The meanings arise from observations of the environment and
the lexicons emerge as a consequence of verbal interaction between agents. Both
of these cases require some perceptual abilities from an agent, e.g. sight and hear-
ing. Therefore it can be said that a language that emerges through these means is
4grounded in perception.
The problem of grounding language in practicality is deeply embedded in perceptual
grounding, which is why perceptual grounding needs to be discussed first. As a
matter of fact, it would be safe to say that the practicality grounding presented in
this thesis is merely an extension to perceptual grounding. In this section grounding
language in perception is discussed through existing work.
The rest of this section is geared towards giving the reader a general idea of how
the problem setting for language emergence is defined and approached in this thesis.
First, the agent society as a whole is discussed. Then, different abilities an individual
agent needs for language learning are described, and different kinds of meanings an
agent might possess are outlined. Next, the main mechanism for language emergence
in this thesis, i.e. language games, is considered. Finally, a model for discrimination
meanings and a lexicon are described, both of which are later used in the experiments
of this thesis.
2.1 Agent society
The agent society where the language emerges is a multi-agent system. There are
multiple definitions for a multi-agent system, for example, Shoham and Leyton-
Brown describe a multi-agent system as follows: "Multi-agent systems are those
systems that include multiple autonomous entities with either diverging information
or diverging interests, or both." [7]
This thesis considers agent societies where a language emerges in a distributed fash-
ion without central control. Every agent learns separately and chooses its actions
itself. It is important to note, that although all agents choose their actions through
the same predefined rules, the choices are based on agent-specific knowledge and
state. Due to the autonomous nature of the agents, the emergence of language is a
bottom-up process.
The agents can only observe their immediate surroundings, so they are only partially
aware of the state of the whole environment. For this reason the emergence of
language is based on local interaction between agents. For the agents to learn a
mutual language, they must have at least partially overlapping observations of the
of the world. For example, the agents could see the same object at the same time.
Through these mutual experiences they can learn common words. Once the agents
have learned some words, they can have conversations even without overlapping
5observations. For example, if agents A and B both have experiences about socks
and colours, A could inform B about the colour of its socks, even though B would
have never seen these particular socks in its lifetime. To the author’s knowledge
previous research on language games has not exploited this property of language.
Instead, the agents have always had at least a partially overlapping observation of
the world.
For simplicity’s sake, although the purpose of the communication in this thesis is the
coordination of the agents, the agents don’t explicitly aim to cooperate with each
other. The agents are selfish and act only based on their personal goals. Considering
other agents’ goals would require an agent to model the "minds" of its peers [8].
An agent is also always truthful in its communication, even though being deceitful
might aid it in its goals. Modelling trust is outside of the scope of this thesis.
2.2 Processing layers
The agents need to be able to observe their environment and interpret language in
order for a language grounded in experiences to emerge in a multi-agent system.
The agents need to be able to associate perceptual observations with words and
vice versa. Therefore the process that associates observations and words has to
be bidirectional. Steels [5] describes an architecture, in which this process involves
three layers: a perceptual layer, a conceptual layer and a lexical layer. The focus of
this thesis is on the conceptual and lexical layers.
The perceptual layer transforms the signals from an agent’s perceptual sensors
into a form the agent can process internally. For example object detection could be
performed on an image captured by the agent’s camera. For each object detected,
different features such as size, colour, and position could be calculated. These
features would at this point only be expressed as numerical values.
The conceptual layer deals with conceptualising the information received from the
perceptual layer. The agent could have a concept for "red", defined by boundaries
for colour values. Or it could have a concept for "left", meaning an x-coordinate
that is smaller than the middle x-coordinate of the image. Concepts such as "red"
and "left" are meanings that the agent can associate with words.
The speaker chooses what meaning it wants to express in the conceptual layer. For
example if the speaker wants to draw the hearer’s attention to a certain object, it
has to choose a meaning that somehow discriminates the object from other objects.
6Let’s consider a situation with two blue objects, o1 and o2, and a red object, o3. All
objects are the same size. The speaker wants to draw the hearers attention to the
object o3 and can only express size or colour. While trying to decide what meaning
to express, the speaker could notice that size does not discriminate o3 from the other
objects, so it is of no use. On the other hand o3 is the only red object, so the speaker
could choose "red" as the meaning to convey.
The hearer’s task in the conceptual layer is the opposite. It’s goal is to associate a
meaning with an object or objects. In the situation described above the meaning
for which a corresponding object needs to be found is "red". Luckily there is only
one red object, so the association can be done unambiguously. If the speaker had
used the meaning "blue", the hearer wouldn’t have had any way to know whether
the speaker is referring to object o1 or o2 (or both).
The lexical layer maintains associations between meanings and words. The asso-
ciations can strengthen and weaken depending on in which context the agent hears
the words being used. In the lexical layer the speaker finds a suitable word associ-
ated with the meaning it chose in the conceptual layer to be uttered. The hearer
tries to interpret the word it hears by linking it to a meaning.
The perceptual layer is mostly relevant for agents that perceive the environment
through sensors that output signals which require interpretation (e.g a camera or
a microphone). In the simulations conducted in this thesis, the agents get the
observations directly in a form that can be used by the conceptual layer.
Additionally, Steels describes a syntactic layer that enables constructing and inter-
preting structures containing multiple words such as sentences. The syntactic layer
is out of the scope of this thesis.
2.3 Meanings
The agents could have many kinds of meanings, but only meanings that can be used
to categorise objects are considered in this thesis. Formally, given the set of all
objects O, a meaning m can be used to define a subset Om ⊂ O. In Section 2.2 the
set of all objects consisted of three objects O = {o1, o2, o3}, from which only o3 was
red. The meaning "red" would define a subset Ored = {o3}. The objects o1 and o2
were blue, so the meaning "blue" would define the subset Oblue = {o1, o2}.
Meanings can be absolute or relative. For example, let’s take an object that is 140cm
in length. An agent could have an absolute meaning, or a category, for objects
7between 130 and 150cm. The 140cm object would always fall into this category
regardless of the context. What about meanings "short" and "tall"? Clearly, if the
object happened to be an adult man, he would be considered short. On the other
hand if the object was a girl of age five, she would be considered tall. The meanings
"short" and "tall" depend on the context and are therefore relative.
How should an agent deal with relative meanings then? In this thesis context-
oriented scaling [5] is used, where an object’s features are scaled (i.e. normalised)
based on the context. Let’s define the context as a subset of all objects C ⊂ O. Now
if an object belongs to C, its feature, e.g. length, can be normalised with respect
to all the objects in C. In this thesis features are normalised to the range [0, 1] 1.
If C is all 5-year-old girls, normalising 140cm would result in a value clearly larger
than 0.5. In the context of adult men, the normalised value would be clearly smaller
than 0.5. By having length categories for below and above 0.5, an agent could have
meanings somewhat corresponding to short and tall. Due to normalising, an agent
can learn relative meanings, which can be used in many kinds of different contexts.
Meanings can of course also be formed in many other ways than just dividing a
feature into value ranges. A meaning could be a combination of value ranges for
different features [5]. An agent could also form prototypes, that would categorise
objects by how close an object’s features are to certain values (see Bleys et al. [9]
for an example in the domain of colours).
There is a distinction to be made between meanings that are linked to a specific
object and meanings that define a category of objects. For example, you might
own a chair that you are so fond of, that you have decided to give it a name.
Let’s say you have named it "Bob-the-chair". "Bob-the-chair" now only means one
object, your beloved chair. In other words from the set of all objects O, "Bob-the-
chair" would define a subset containing exactly one specific object. In contrast the
meaning "chair" defines a category of objects. "Chair" would define a subset from
O containing all chairs. The focus in this thesis is on the latter kind of meanings,
because they allow for more flexibility in communication. The benefit of general,
category defining meanings can be seen for instance if the agents are moved to a
new environment. If the agents would have just named specific objects in their old
environment, they would have to create a new language from scratch in the new
environment. With more general meanings, in the best case scenario, the agents
1Features values are assumed to be interval variables. Categorical or nominal features are not
considered.
8wouldn’t have to make any adjustments to their language at all.
One can also imagine a dichotomy between functional and non-functional meanings.
A functional meaning represents what the function of an object is. Consider a
hammer for instance. Oxford Dictionary of English provides the following definition
for hammer: "a tool with a heavy metal head mounted at right angles at the end
of a handle, used for jobs such as breaking things and driving in nails" [10]. The
latter part of the definition consists of a functional meaning, which describes what a
hammer is used for. All the other meanings described so far in this chapter have been
non-functional meanings. The length of an object only describes a physical feature
of an object, not what its function is, and is therefore a non-functional meaning.
Due to the difficulty of having an AI understand and learn functional meanings,
this thesis considers only non-functional meanings. Non-functional meanings can
already be extracted from physical objects with machine vision, as was done in the
Talking Heads experiment [11].
2.4 Language games
Language games are an abstraction of language use created by Wittgenstein [12].
They were originally used to illustrate language use between humans. Wittgenstein
describes the builder’s language game as an example. In it a builder A and an
assistant B have a language, that consists of the words: "block", "pillar", "slab",
and "beam". A calls the words out and B brings the corresponding stones.
In this thesis language games are the main mechanism for language emergence.
Agents learn meanings and align their lexicons by playing language games with
each other. Diverging from previous research, in this thesis language games are also
used to transfer important information, which the agents can use to make better
decisions about how to act.
Steels [13] was the first one to use language games in a computational multi-agent
system. Steels showed that a language consisting of words and meanings can emerge
spontaneously in an agent society as a consequence of language games [14]. In Steels’
experiments the agents started without meanings or words. The agents learned new
meanings and words associated with them by repeatedly playing language games
with each other. Words spread in the society only through local games between two
agents.
A language game can involve multiple agents in different roles. Up to now research
9in computational multi-agent systems has focused on games between just two agents,
other one being the speaker and the other one the hearer [5, 15, 16, 17]. The speaker’s
goal is to express a certain meaning with an utterance. The hearer attempts to
interpret the meaning behind this utterance. In Section 6.3 a language game called
the Query Game is introduced, which involves one speaker and multiple hearers.
In language games the communication is not limited to verbal utterances. The agents
can additionally have non-verbal communication methods. For example Spranger et
al. [18] conducted experiments with humanoid robots, that can use their hands for
pointing. This ability is used by the speaker to indicate to the hearer which object
it was referring to with its utterance. 2
Language games provide agents with a framework for their communication. Due to
having a common framework, the agents don’t have to consider all the practically
infinite interpretations that an unknown word can have in any given situation. For
example in the Guessing Game [5], the goal of the speaker is to give a verbal hint
of an object, so that the hearer can identify which object is being talked about.
Therefore the hearer can assume that the the speaker’s utterance refers to a specific
object and is something that can discriminate this object from other objects.
Included in the framework is a script for the agents to follow in their interaction. In
the variation of the Guessing Game used in the Talking Heads experiment, agents
observe shapes such as triangles, squares, and circles on a whiteboard [11]. An
agent perceives the whiteboard through a camera, which can be used to look at
different parts of the whiteboard. The context for the Guessing Game is determined
by which part of the whiteboard the agents are looking at. The agents can perceive
different features for the shapes including colour, average gray-scale and position.
The speaker picks a shape as the conversation topic and chooses a word describing
one of the features of the topic. The hearer tries to guess which shape the speaker
is referring to. Below is the script for their interaction (assuming that the agents
are already looking at the same part of the whiteboard):
2The robots could not infer which object was being pointed at by the other robot through visual
information alone. Instead they sent the xy-coordinates of the objects to each other directly.
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1. The speaker randomly picks the conversation topic from the set of shapes it
perceives.
2. The speaker chooses a meaning that discriminates the topic from the other
shapes in the perceived context and utters a corresponding word.
3. The hearer interprets the word, guesses what the topic is and points to it.
4. If the hearer is not able to come up with a guess or points to the wrong shape
in step 3, the speaker points to the topic.
The Guessing Game described above is an example of a language game with feed-
back. The pointing gives both agents feedback on the success of the game. If the
hearer points to the wrong shape, or fails to point at all, the speaker knows the game
failed. If the speaker has to correct the hearer by pointing to the correct topic, the
hearer knows the game failed. If the hearer points to the correct topic, both agents
know the game succeeded. There are also language games where the agents don’t
get any feedback on the success or failure of the game. Smith [16] has shown that a
language can emerge even without feedback.
In this thesis two new feedbackless language games are introduced: the Place Game
and the Query Game. With these games the agents learn meanings to refer to
different locations in their environment and communicate useful information to each
other. The games are described in detail later in Section 6.
2.5 Language models
Language emergence requires the agents to have dynamic models for maintaining
meanings and lexicons. In this section models, that are the basis for the implemen-
tation of our agents, are described.
2.5.1 Discrimination trees
Discrimination trees [19] can be used to categorise objects based on a specific feature.
The nodes in a discrimination tree are categorisers, that define a value range. A
node’s range is always contained in its parent’s range. Every node, or categoriser,
is a separate meaning that an agent can associate with a word. A categoriser that
defines the value range [i, j] for feature f is notated with [i-j]f .
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Let’s consider an agent which perceives an object’s size, s, as a normalised value
in range [0, 1]. The root of the discrimination tree would in this case be all values
covering categoriser [0-1]s. Dividing this range into two halves results in categorisers
[0-0.5]s (small) and [0.5-1]s (large), which are the children of the root node. The
categoriser [0-0.5]s could be further divided into categorisers [0-0.25]s (very small)
and [0.25-0.5]s (smallish) and so on. This tree is depicted in Figure 1. In this thesis
the value range of a categoriser is always divided into two halves, although this is
not required by discrimination trees.
small  [0­0.5] 
[0­1]
[0.5­1]  large 
very small  [0­0.25]   [0.25­0.5]  smallish 
Figure 1: An example of a discrimination tree.
Agents can use discrimination trees to discriminate objects in the conceptual layer
discussed in Section 2.2. For an example, let’s consider a context with three object
o1, o2, and o3, with sizes 0.2, 0.6, and 0.8 respectively. An agent can discriminate
the object o1 from the other objects by using the categoriser [0-0.5]s (or [0-0.25]s),
because o1 is the only object, whose size is in that categoriser’s range.
In this context objects o2 and o3 can’t be discriminated unambiguously with the
discrimination tree described above, because it doesn’t have a categoriser that would
contain only one of them. If the agent had a need to discriminate between o2 and
o3, it could grow the discrimination tree by dividing the categoriser [0.5-1]s into
categorisers [0.5-0.75]s and [0.75-1]s. With the new categorisers both o2 and o3 can
be discriminated unambiguously from all other objects. Growing the discrimination
tree is one way for the agents to gain new meanings.
2.5.2 Lexicon
In this thesis lexicon is defined as a model that maintains associations between
meanings (e.g. categorisers in a discrimination tree) and words. It is used to both
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transform a meaning into a word and a word into a meaning.
Steels [5] presents a lexicon, which stores a score between 0 and 1 for each meaning-
word pair. The score represents how successful a pair has been. The higher the
score, the more success has been had using the pair in language games,
A word can be associated with multiple meanings (ambiguity) and a meaning can
be associated with multiple words (synonymy). See Table 1 for an example lexicon.
webe fomodu ranu mamebo
[0-0.5]s 0.3 0.1 0.8 -
[0.5-1]s - - 0.2 0.6
Table 1: An example lexicon.
Steels describes update mechanisms based on the success or failure of a game round.
In this thesis the language games don’t have feedback, so the agents don’t know
if the game succeeds or fails. Instead an update mechanism is used, where the
hearer always updates the association between the word used by the speaker and
the interpreted meaning. When the score of a meaning-word pair is updated, it is
incremented by δ. For lateral inhibition, the score of all other pairs that contain
either the meaning, or the word, is decremented by δ. In this thesis δ is set to 0.1.
The score is clamped between 0 and 1.
Only the hearer updates the meaning-word association, because this was detected to
work better while building the experiments. However, no formal experiments were
conducted to investigate the issue further. The author speculates that it is better to
only try to learn what words other agents are using and not to confuse the learning
process also with words oneself uses. Image for example an agent society, where
all agents but one already have a well established word for meaning m. Now the
one agent, A, that doesn’t know the word makes up its own word, w, for m. If the
speaker also performs an update and A happens to be the speaker in a couple of
games in a row in games where m is used, A will form a strong association between
the "wrong" word w and m. At this point all other agents would be using a different
word than A, and A would require multiple rounds as the hearer to align its lexicon
properly with the others. Problems like this do not arise if the speaker doesn’t
perform updates.
When an agent is translating a meaning into a word, it simply selects the word with
the highest score for the meaning. Similarly, a word is translated into a meaning by
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choosing the meaning that has the highest associated score for the word. Given the
lexicon in Table 1, for meaning [0.5-1]s, the word mamebo would be chosen, because
it has the highest score in the row. For the word ranu, the meaning [0-0.5]s would
be chosen, because it has the highest score in the column.
2.6 Summary
The problem setting for language emergence in this thesis has now been described.
This will serve as a starting point for the contributions of this thesis on grounding
language in practicality beginning in the next section. Below a summary of the most
important points to remember going forward.
• The agent society consists of autonomous agents learning individually through
their own experiences (Section 2.1).
• The agents learn general, category-defining meanings that can in theory be
applied to new environments directly (Section 2.3).
• The language emerges as a consequence of the agents repeatedly playing lan-
guage games amongst each other (Section 2.4).
• An agent has a lexicon that maintains associations between meanings and
words (Section 2.5.2).
3 Grounding language in practicality
The goal of this thesis is to ground language not only in perception, but the needs
of the agents, i.e. practicality, as well. The needs of an agent arise from its goals,
i.e. what it is trying to accomplish. However, the needs of an agent are not dictated
by its goals alone, but also by the environment it is situated in. As what kind
of a language is practical depends on the goals and the environment, the agents
need some kind of abilities for guiding the language emergence according to their
situation.
Practicality and its implications for language are discussed in more detail next.
After that, the rest of the section is devoted for introducing abilities for practicality
grounding.
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3.1 Practicality
In this thesis a language is deemed practical, if it somehow helps an agent in reaching
its goals. One could argue that creating or learning a language can be seen as a
goal in itself, which is true. In fact, this has been the implied goal for the agents
in previous research on language games in computational agent societies. This is
because the research has focused on how a language might emerge and how different
mechanisms affect the emergence (see Section 8 for more information). The agents
have merely been vessels for the language, without any aspirations of their own. The
performance of these agents has been mainly measured in terms of communication
success rate, i.e. how often the agents succeed in the language games they play
amongst each other.
The focus is shifted in this thesis by asking how a practical language might emerge.
In other words, how might a language emerge, that the agents can use as a tool
for performing their tasks. The agents don’t develop a language just for the sake
of developing a language, but as a means to an end. Communication success rate
alone isn’t a sufficient evaluation measurement anymore. It is possible for a society of
agents to have a completely useless language with a perfect communication success
rate.
Imagine for example the builder’s language game described in Section 2.4, where
a builder and an assistant had a language consisting of words for different kind of
stones. The builder in this case is presumably trying to build something, which is
why he needs the assistant to bring him the correct stones. The described language
is great for this purpose, as the builder can use it to acquire the right stones. If
instead the language consisted of names for different bird species, the builder would
be in trouble, as this language couldn’t be used to guide the assistant in the stone
selection. Practicality of a language then seems to be dependent on its user’s goals.
The builder’s language game highlights another interesting aspect of practicality
based grounding. The builder and assistant don’t need to have the same goals in
order for a language to be practical for both of them. As already mentioned, the
builder’s goal could conceivably be to build something. The assistant’s goal could
instead be just to keep his job, so that he can some day buy his dream car. Even
though the builder and assistant have different goals, both benefit from speaking
the same language.
An agent’s goals, however, are not the only determining factor for what kind of a
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language would be practical to it. Practicality is also dependent on the environment
the agent is situated in. The builder and the assistant had the word "pillar". Let’s
say that in their world two types of pillars exist: type 1 and type 2. The word "pillar"
can refer to both of these types. The builder only needs type 1 for the house it is
building. If the construction site only had type 1 pillars, the agents wouldn’t have
any problem coping with just having the word "pillar" in their language. If the
construction site had both type 1 and type 2 pillars, the assistant wouldn’t know
which kind of pillar to fetch, when he hears the builder shouting "pillar". A way to
address the problem would be to have different words for type 1 and type 2 pillars.
The only thing that changed between these two scenarios was the environment. The
builder was still building the same house, and the assistant was still just trying to
keep his job. The type 2 pillars weren’t even used in the construction. Nevertheless
the mere presence of them changed the requirements for the language.
3.2 Goal monitoring
An agent’s ability to monitor how well it is reaching its goals is the key to grounding
language in practicality in this thesis. More precisely, the agents in this thesis mon-
itor how well they are performing a task. The agents use the information from the
monitoring to learn meanings that affect their performance. If something doesn’t af-
fect an agent’s performance, there is no need to communicate about it. If something
does affect an agent’s performance, it might be something worth conceptualising and
communicating about. Of course if an agent is also interested in how other agents
are doing, just considering one’s own performance is not enough. But as already
explained in Section 2.1, for simplicity’s sake only agents that act solely based on
their own goals are considered here.
How exactly the monitoring is used to derive practical meanings can be implemented
in several ways. For instance, in the setting for the experiments conducted in this
thesis, the agents make plans for moving from point A to point B. The plan in
this case is the route which the agent is going to take. If everything goes to plan,
the agent doesn’t need to learn anything language related. In case something that
hinders the plan happens, it is used as a learning opportunity. In the experiments,
when an agent gets blocked by another agent in a tight space, the agent might
have to backtrack and take a longer route than originally planned. A situation like
this provides a great opportunity for playing a language game, because both agents
are physically in the same place, their observations overlapping, while something
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important is happening. Through language games they learn to refer to similar tight
spaces. Then in the future, they can avoid being blocked again by communicating
about the tight spaces they are planning to pass through. The experiment setting
is detailed more in Section 4 and the language games are described in Section 6.
In addition to having practical meanings, it might be useful to model the impor-
tance of different meanings. In a situation where an agent can’t communicate all
the meanings that could possibly affect its plan, the agent has to choose what to
communicate. If it can communicate only one meaning, then a natural choice would
be to communicate the meaning that affects its performance most. The importance
of a meaning then represents how big of an effect the meaning has to an agent’s
performance.
A sufficiently intelligent agent might be able to deduce the importance of a meaning
in any given situation through some kind of a reasoning. A less intelligent agent
however might have to resort to merely maintaining statistics on the importance of
different meanings based on its experiences. These statistics could manifest them-
selves, e.g., as a scalar value associated with each meaning. Depending on whether
the effect of a meaning is performance enhancing or hindering, the scalar value could
be positive or negative. Continuing the example from above, when the agent gets
blocked, it knows how much longer the new route is compared to the original plan.
This information can be used to give an importance value to a meaning. If it only
needs to take a couple of extra steps, the meaning representing that situation is
not very important. If the new route is considerably longer, the importance value
should reflect that.
Maintaining importance values allows the agents to avoid having to deal with func-
tional meanings (see Section 2.3). An agent doesn’t need to understand that it might
need to backtrack and take extra steps if it is blocked in a tight space. All it needs
to know is that a tight space is associated with a negative effect on its performance.
3.3 Determining context
For playing language games, two agents need a common context. In this thesis, the
context is defined as described in Section 2.3, i.e. given the set of all objects O, the
context is a subset C ⊂ O. Each agent has to determine the context individually.
An agent can do that in two ways, detailed next.
First one is to use its sensors and determine the object set from what it is currently
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perceiving. For example in a game with a speaker and a hearer, the speaker could
simply look at a part of its environment with its camera. The context could be
the set of objects inside the field of view of the camera, as in the Talking Heads
experiment [11] described in Section 2.4. The hearer then would have to try to
infer, which context the speaker has determined. This could be achieved by looking
at the speaker and inferring where its camera is pointing at. Then the hearer could
point its camera in the same direction. This method can be used when both agents
can perceive the topic object of the language game.
Second one is to use its internal model, e.g. a map, of the environment. The agents
can talk about objects in their models, such as parts of the map, that neither of them
is currently perceiving. Because the agents can’t rely on their perceptions to get a set
of objects, they have to have some way of deriving objects from their internal model.
Given the ability to detect objects through perception, as discussed above, an agent
could simply keep track of the objects it has seen, and derive the context from them.
Another approach, used in the experiments of this thesis, is to derive objects from
the internal model of the environment using learned meanings. Suppose that the
speaker has learned the meaning "corridor" and wants to talk about a "corridor"
that is in its map. The context could be all "corridors" that are in the speaker’s
map. To give the hearer a hint of the context, the speaker could either point to a
"corridor" both agents are perceiving, or say the word corresponding to "corridor"
in their language. The hearer can then take all the "corridors" that are in its map
as the context. To the author’s knowledge, the context has not been determined in
any previous research by deriving it from an internal model of the environment.
It is also conceivable to combine these two approaches in one language game. The
speaker could describe an object that it is perceiving, while the hearer has to guess
what kind of an object it is solely based on the description. Or the speaker could
describe what kind of an object it wants the hearer to fetch. The hearer then would
perceive a set of objects, possibly in another room, from which it has to choose the
most suitable one.
In the ideal situation agents engaging in a language game would share the same
idea of the context. In a game between agents A and B, that have determined the
contexts CA and CB respectfully, this would mean CA = CB. In realistic scenarios it
isn’t reasonable to assume that both agents can derive precisely the same context.
For instance in the Talking Heads experiment, the agents use cameras to perceive
shapes on a white board. The context is determined by which objects are included
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in the image captured by a camera. Each agent uses a different camera, so there is
always a slight difference in the image they receive. Sometimes the difference causes
the agents to perceive differing object sets, so that CA 6= CB. In the case the context
is derived from an internal model, causes for different views of the context include
differences in models between the agents and misunderstood communication about
what the context should be.
In previous studies the context has been selected randomly. For practical purposes,
the context has to be chosen so that the language games can convey information
that is useful to the agents. In other words, playing language games has to allow
the agents to gain knowledge they can use in their decision making. This can
be achieved by playing games about objects that are important (as discussed in
the previous section) and part of an agent’s plan. For example, once an agent has
planned a route for itself, it could start a language game where the topic of the game
is the place with the most importance in the route. This place could correspond to
a "corridor", which might have a negative importance value in case the agent has
been blocked in "corridors" before. If the agent manages to indicate the "corridor"
that is in its path from the context of all possible "corridors" to the other agents,
the others would gain the knowledge of which "corridor" is part of the agent’s plans.
The knowledge could lead the other agents to avoid the "corridor".
3.4 Option-based discrimination
A common task in language games is to discriminate an object from a set of objects.
For example, with a set consisting of a red object and two blue objects, the red
object could be discriminated by saying "red". In precise terms, when an object oj
is to be discriminated given a set of objects O = {o1, . . . , oi}, the goal is to choose a
meaning m that only describes oj, i.e. Om = {oj}. This was the task, for example,
in the Talking Heads experiment [11].
In this thesis a slightly different discrimination problem is introduced. First of all,
there is no single object to be discriminated. Instead, the agents discriminate a
subset of objects, D1 ⊂ O, from another subset of objects, D2 ⊂ O. The subsets do
not share any objects, i.e. D1 ∩ D2 = ∅. The goal now is to choose a meaning m,
so that D1 ⊂ Om and D2 ∩ Om = ∅. Note that this definition allows m to describe
objects in O that are not in D1, which means that Om can be larger than D1. The
task could be generalised so that a subset is discriminated from an arbitrary number
of other subsets, but in this thesis we only consider situations with two subsets D1
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and D2.
The subsets D1 and D2 represent the options an agent has, which means that the
goal of the discrimination is to distinguish an agent’s options from each other. The
motivation for this kind of option-based discrimination is that an agent needs infor-
mation from communication, which helps it make decisions. If the content of the
communication does not discriminate between an agent’s options, it might not be
very useful for decision making.
Suppose that the agents are in a 2D grid world, where they have to make choices over
what route to take to their destination (this is actually the case in the experiment
described in the next section). D1 could be a set of cells in one route option and
D2 a set of cells in another route option. Depending on how the environment is
laid out, finding a meaning that can perfectly discriminate D1 from all other objects
might be difficult, if not outright impossible. However, option-based discrimination
doesn’t require a perfect discrimination. For practicality a perfect discrimination is
not necessary. The discrimination needs to only be accurate enough to allow the
agents to make meaningful decisions.
In this thesis the agents use option-based discrimination to discriminate between
different types of places on a map. The discrimination happens as a part of the
Query Game, later detailed in Section 6.3. The implementation of the option-based
discrimination is described in Section 6.3.2.
3.5 Summary
Grounding language in practicality has now been introduced on a conceptual level.
To allow grounding in practicality, several abilities were introduced for the agents.
These are the learning of meanings through goal monitoring (Section 3.2), determin-
ing the context of a language game from an agent’s internal model using importance
(Section 3.3) and distinguishing an agents options with option-based discrimination
(Section 3.4).
It should be pointed out that none of these abilities are inherently required for
grounding language in practicality, but are merely suggestions for doing so. Ground-
ing language in practicality is an open-ended problem that can be approached with
many kinds of methods.
This concludes the conceptual part of the thesis. In the rest of the thesis grounding
language in practicality is investigated through empirical experiments conducted
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through computer simulations.
4 The experiment setting
The experiment setting in this thesis revolves around a warehouse environment,
where agents fetch items from shelves. The agents’ goal is to be as efficient in this
task as possible, which means that a language can be seen as practical if it increases
the amount of deliveries the agents make.
The main purpose of this experiment is to see if the abilities for grounding language
in practicality introduced in the previous section actually work. Simultaneously the
implementation of the agents serves as an example for others who might want to
create their own agents. Additionally, this experiment is used to learn about different
aspects and challenges of practicality grounding through hands on experimentation.
The experiments are conducted in three distinct phases, each with its own dedicated
section. The phases are shortly described next.
Phase 1 (Section 5) The basic environment and agent behaviour is implemented
without language. The results from this phase serve as a baseline for the second
phase, where a society utilising language is realised.
Phase 2 (Section 6) The purpose of the second phase is to set up an agent soci-
ety, where a language grounded in practicality emerges. To this end two language
games, the Place and the Query Game, are introduced and the abilities for grounding
language in practicality discussed in the previous section are implemented.
Phase 3 (Section 7) In the third phase, different properties of the language are
explored, such as how well the meanings learned in one environment transfer to
another.
The rest of this section details the basic implementation of the experiment setup,
that serves as a basis for all the phases. First, the warehouse environment and the
agents and their behaviour is described. Then, the methods used for evaluating the
experiments are discussed.
4.1 The warehouse environment
The agents reside in a warehouse, where their task is to fetch items from shelves.
The environment is modelled as a two-dimensional grid, as depicted in Figure 2. A
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grid cell can contain a wall, a shelf, an agent, or an order centre. A cell can’t contain
more than one object, making it so that the agents can’t pass through non-empty
cells. The order centre is where the agents get orders to fetch items. The items are
also delivered to the order centre. Time in the environment passes in discrete steps.
Figure 2: A warehouse environment with agents in example positions.
The environment has been designed with three aspects in mind. First, an agent
should have a goal that it can monitor by itself. The goal of an agent is to deliver
a specific item to the order centre. This task doesn’t require an agent to be aware
of which items the other agents are fetching. Also if something goes wrong during
a delivery, i.e. the agent gets blocked and the delivery takes longer than originally
planned, the agent can detect it.
Second, an agent should have options to choose from when acting in the environment.
Language is used to select between these options. If an agent didn’t have any options
on how to act, language would be meaningless. The options in this environment arise
from the fact that an item can be picked up from any side of a shelf. For example,
when an item is requested from one of the shelves in the same column as the order
centre in Figure 2, an agent can pick it up from either the left, or the right side of
the shelf. Communicating with language can help the agent to choose which side it
should go to.
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Third, communication should be required for acting efficiently in the environment.
In the warehouse, an agent’s performance can be hindered only if it is blocked by
another agent. The agents can act more efficiently, if they have some way of avoiding
each other. The orders are given to the agents randomly, so that the agents only way
of getting information about the location of other agents is through communication.
If the orders weren’t random, the agents could learn the pattern behind them, and
use that knowledge to avoid each other. Of course learning a simple language might
be faster, than learning the behaviour pattern of a whole society of agents, but
investigating that is out of the scope of this thesis.
4.2 Agent
The agents have been designed for the experiment environment. They have been
equipped with basic skills that allow them to perform deliveries even in the absence
of language. Performance without language serves as a baseline to compare results
once the agents utilise language. Every aspect of their behaviour is entirely prede-
termined, barred from the content of their communication. Next the basic behaviour
without language is described. Then, how the agents plan routes is discussed.
4.2.1 Basic behaviour
The agents behave according to the following pattern:
1. Get an order (from the order centre) to fetch some item
2. Plan the route to the shelf that contains the item
3. Move to the shelf and pick up the item
4. Plan the route back to the action centre
5. Move to the action centre and drop the item
6. Start from 1 again
From this pattern follows, that an agent will be constantly moving back and forth
between the order centre and a shelf.
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During a single time step an agent can move one cell. All other actions such as
picking up an item, playing a language game, planning a route, and turning do not
take time.
A collision happens when an agent tries to move to a cell that already contains
another agent. When two agents collide, the one that is not carrying an item will
give way, unless it can immediately compute a new route. An agent gives way by
taking random steps towards the action centre until its path to its destination is
clear again. This behaviour has been designed to prevent agents from getting stuck
in the environment.
4.2.2 Route planning
The route planning is done with the A* search algorithm [20]. To this end, each
agent has a map of the environment, where each cell containing a permanent object
(wall, shelf, or order centre), is marked. The location of another agent can also be
marked on the map, if it is in an adjacent cell.
The environment has been designed in a way that in step 2 of the agent behaviour,
when an agent plans a route to a shelf the agent has two options, i.e. which side
of the shelf to pick up the item. How the agents utilise language to select between
these options is described in Section 6. Here the agents have to make the choice
without language and for this we test two alternative route planning schemes: the
shortest scheme and the random scheme.
The shortest scheme An agent simply compute the shortest route to the shelf
and uses that. Although using the shortest route seems intuitively very reasonable,
it might perform poorly e.g. due to the agents crowding to the same places, which
is why the random scheme is also tested.
The random scheme An agent first calculates the shortest route as in the shortest
scheme. Then the agent computes a second route assuming that the last cell in the
first route is blocked, giving the agent the second shortest route. Once language is
implemented, the agents will utilise it to gain information over these two options
to make better selections. Before the agents have language, they don’t have useful
information about the options and will make the selection between the two options
randomly.
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4.3 Evaluation methods
Before moving on to the experiment results, how the experiments should be evalu-
ated needs to be discussed. The main measurement used is the amount of deliveries
an agent makes during a simulation run, which reflects the performance of an agent.
From the point of view of practicality it could be argued that this is the only measure-
ment that matters, as practicality is only concerned with performance. Regardless,
various other measurements are also taken to analyse the behaviour of the agent
society and the emergence and properties of the language.
4.4 Summary
An experiment setting where agents fetch items from shelves in a warehouse has
now been described. The agents are able to operate reasonably in this setting
even without language, which offers a comparison point for once the agents utilise
language. The agents’ goal of making deliveries as efficiently as possible offers a
way to measure the practicality of a language through the amount of deliveries the
agents make.
5 Baseline experiment
To test whether the agents perform better with the shortest or the random scheme
(see Section 4.2.2), experiments were run with 6 agents in the described warehouse
environment, as depicted in Figure 2. For both schemes 100 simulations with 100
000 time steps were run. The reported values are averages from these simulations.
From Table 2 it can be seen that with the random scheme, an agent makes more
deliveries than with shortest scheme. For this reason, random scheme will serve as
the baseline for performance.
Measurement Random scheme Shortest scheme
Deliveries 4414± 5 3668± 7
Collisions 3670± 13 7067± 18
Table 2: Mean deliveries made and times collided for an agent during a single
simulation run. The means are displayed with 99% confidence interval.
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Although the agents take longer routes with the random scheme than with the
shortest scheme, they make more deliveries, because they collide less. In Figure 3
it can be seen that with the shortest scheme the agents tend to clump around the
bottom middle shelf, resulting in a lot of collisions. With random scheme there is
less collisions and they are more spread out.
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Figure 3: Collision heat maps for a society using shortest scheme (left) and a society
using random scheme (right). Shelves are marked with brown squares.
6 Setting up language
The primary goal of the experiments is to show, that the abilities for grounding
language in practicality introduced in Section 3 can work, i.e. result in a language
that is useful to the agents. To this end these abilities are implemented in the agents
here.
To facilitate the use of language two new language games are introduced: the Place
Game and the Query Game. In the Place Game the agents learn words for different
types of places in the environment. In the Query Game the agents learn words for
discriminating between places of the same type. Additionally in the Query Game,
the agents communicate useful information to each other that allows them to make
better decisions. The Place Game can be played independently of the Query Game,
but the Query Game requires the meanings learned in the Place Game. For this
reason Place Game is described and tested first.
Next, the meanings the agents learn and communicate in the language games are
detailed. Then the Place Game is described and experiments are conducted with
it to see how the language emerges for different types of places. Finally the Query
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Game is described and experiments are conducted in a society playing both of the
games to investigate if the agents are able to utilise the emerging language in a
practical way.
6.1 Meanings
In order to use language, the agents need to be able to learn meanings and associate
them with words. The agents can learn two types of meanings: place meanings and
discrimination meanings. Place meanings refer to different types of places on the
map. Discrimination meanings are used to discriminate a place from other places of
the same type. Using place and discrimination meanings together, the agents can
pinpoint different locations on the map. How the meanings are learned and used
depends on the language games the agents play.
A place meaning is a 3x3 grid, defining the contents of cells in a local area, as
shown in Figure 4. An agent can perceive the 3x3 grid around it and memorise the
grid as a meaning.
A discrimination meaning is a node in a discrimination tree, i.e. categoriser, as
described in Section 2.5.1. The features used for the discrimination trees are the
xy-coordinates of the cells in the map. An agent has a separate discrimination tree
for both the x- and y-coordinate, allowing the agent to discriminate places based on
location.
A place meaning can be used to define a subset of cells on the map, which corresponds
to the context as discussed in Section 3.3. The set defined by a place meaning
contains all the cells that correspond to it. A cell corresponds to a place meaning
if the 3x3 grid surrounding it is equal to the 3x3 grid of the place meaning. See
Figure 4 for an example.
Each place meaning is associated with an importance value (as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2). The importance value represents the effect the place has on the agent’s
performance. In the warehouse experiment setup, it translates into how many ex-
tra steps an agent has to take when a collision happens in a place corresponding
to the place meaning in question. Of course in a complex environment, all places
that correspond to the same place meaning probably don’t have the same effect on
performance, but modelling that is out of the scope of this thesis. Instead, all places
of the same type are considered equally important.
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Figure 4: On the left the place meaning corresponding to the surroundings of the left
agent. All the cells on the map corresponding to this meaning have been outlined.
6.2 The Place Game
The purpose of the Place Game is to allow the agents to learn and name place
meanings. The Place Game is played between a speaker and a hearer. The speaker
utters the word it has associated with its current surroundings. The speaker and
the hearer update the association with its current surroundings and the word. An
assumption is made in the Place Game, that the topic of the game is the place where
the agents are currently situated. Alongside the Place Game, agents also update
importance values for place meanings, although this is not directly part of the Place
Game itself.
The script for the Place Game, with agent A as the speaker and B as the hearer
goes as follows:
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1. A perceives its current surroundings and derives a place meaning from it (the
3x3 grid around A).
2. A fetches the word associated with the place meaning from its lexicon. If there
is no association, a new word is generated randomly, and it is associated with
the place meaning.
3. A utters the word to B.
4. B perceives its current surroundings and derives a place meaning from it.
5. B updates its lexicon by incrementing the score between its derived place
meaning and the uttered word. The score of all other pairs that contain either
the meaning, or the word, is decremented by 0.1. (see Section 2.5.2 for details).
The Place Game is played when an agent that doesn’t have an item tries to move into
a cell that has another agent in it, i.e. when a collision happens. As was explained
in Section 4.2.1, this will cause the agent to give way. At this point an agent can
detect that its performance was hindered and it will initiate a Place Game. The
agent giving way has to be the one to initiate the game, because the other agent
has no way to detect that something important happened. The other agent will
continue performing its task as if nothing happened.
After the Place Game is played, the initiator agent will keep track of how many
steps it has to take while giving way. The steps are counted until the route is clear
again and the agent can continue its task. The amount of steps counted this way is
noted with s. The place meaning, p, for which the importance value, ip, is updated
is the one the agent used in the Place Game. When an agent stops giving way, it
will update ip with the formula ip ← ip + λ(−s − ip), where λ controls the update
rate. From the formula it can be seen, that the value of ip is updated towards −s
(a negative value is used, because the effect is negative to performance). The result
is an estimate of how many steps an agent has to take while giving way when a
collision happens in a place corresponding to p. How λ should be picked depends
on the variance of the variable that is learned. In this case, if the value of s varies
greatly, a low value should be set for λ to prevent high oscillation of ip. In case of
low variance, λ can be set to a higher value to speed up learning. In this thesis λ is
set to 0.1.
The formula was introduced by Claus and Boutilier [21] and is a simplified version of
a common reinforcement learning method called Q-learning [22]. Originally the for-
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mula is used to update so-called Q-values, that are associated with different actions
an agent can take. A Q-value represents the estimated reward that is gained by
taking an action. Here the formula has been adapted for the purposes of updating
importance values associated with place meanings.
6.2.1 Example rounds
Figure 5 shows two example situations for the Place Game. An example of a game
round is given for both next assuming that the speaker, A, is the top agent and the
hearer, B, is the bottom agent.
(a) Symmetric situation (b) Asymmetric situation
Figure 5: Example situations for the Place Game.
Example 1, symmetric situation
The situation in Figure 5a is a symmetric situation, where the 3x3 grid around both
agents is identical. Below is an example round in this situation:
1. A perceives the 3x3 grid around it and uses it as the place meaning.
2. A translates the meaning into the word mamebo.
3. A utters mamebo
4. B perceives the 3x3 grid around it.
5. B updates the association between mamebo and the 3x3 grid around it.
In this example A and B perceive the same 3x3 grid. B updates the association
between the same meaning-word pair as was used by A and as a result B is more
likely to use the same word as A for the same kind of a place in the future.
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Example 2, asymmetric situation
The situation in Figure 5b is an asymmetric situation, which means that the agents
have different kinds of 3x3 grids around them. As both agents perceive their sur-
roundings independently for the Place Game, the agents will use different meanings
in the game. Below is an example round for this situation:
1. A perceives the 3x3 grid around it and uses it as the place meaning.
2. A translates the meaning into the word fomodu.
3. A utters fomodu
4. B perceives the 3x3 grid around it.
5. B updates the association between fomodu and the 3x3 grid around it.
This time B had a different perception of the surroundings than A. B updates
the wrong meaning-word pair in its lexicon, making misunderstandings between the
agents more likely in the future.
6.2.2 Experiments
Experiments were run in a society where the agents play The Place Game and
learn importance values. The experiment setup is exactly the same as the previous
setup in Section 5, except with the Place Game. The goal of these experiments
was to validate that a language for places emerges and that the agents can learn
meaningful importance values for the place meanings. The performance of the agents
is not evaluated here, because playing the Place Game does not affect the agents
route choices or anything else that could affect their performance compared to the
previous experiment setup. 100 simulations were run with 100 000 time steps and
6 agents. The run averages are reported. The simulations were run in the same
warehouse environment as the experiments without language in Section 5.
A direct comparison of the agents’ lexicons reveals that they are highly incoherent.
By the end of a simulation, only 68% of all learned meanings are in every agent’s
lexicon. Out of the meanings learned by all agents, only 14% are translated to the
same word by every agent. The cause for such incoherence is the way the agents have
been implemented. They can’t form a language for asymmetric situations where the
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speaker and the hearer have different observations of the environment (see Example
2 in previous section). Of the games played only 35% are in symmetric situations.
Figure 6 shows that overall in all games, the agents have a low success rate. A
game is successful if the hearer’s interpretation of the uttered word is correct, i.e. it
matches the meaning meant by the speaker. 3 Otherwise the game fails. However,
when only symmetric games are considered, the success rate approaches 100%.
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Figure 6: The success rate of games played smoothed over 1000 time steps. Showing
only 50 000 time steps, after which the curves plateau.
Figure 7 confirms that maintaining the importance values works reasonably. Higher
importance is given to places where there is a higher chance of having to back away
for longer time periods.
-3.58 -3.50 -2.20 -2.11 -1.50 -1.47
Figure 7: Importance value for the six most important places.
For the top two most important meanings the language is highly coherent. For the
most important meaning all agents use the same word by the end of the run. For
the second most meaning all agents use the same word by the end of 93% of runs.
3The interpretation is not used in the game itself, and information of the success is not available
to the agents. They are only used for analysis purposes.
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6.2.3 Discussion
Although overall the learned language is incoherent, it doesn’t mean that the lan-
guage can’t be practical. In the experiment settings of this thesis, the language
needs to be coherent only for the most important meanings. This is because they
are the ones used in the Query Game, which the agents use for selecting routes. In-
deed, for the two most important meanings a coherent language emerges. In other
settings a more coherent language might be required for less important meanings as
well.
The incoherence of the language is caused by how the perception of the place mean-
ing is implemented. Because the agents only consider the 3x3 grid around them-
selves, there are several situations where perceptions differ. To get around this
problem the agents could be implemented in multiple different ways. For exam-
ple, the agents could perceive the 3x4 grid around both of them or they could use
perspective alignment [23] to understand each others visual perspective.
To conclude it seems that the current implementation of the agents and the Place
Game are good enough for the purposes of this thesis. The emerged language is
coherent for the most important place meanings that are used for determining the
context (see Section 3.3) for the Query Game.
6.3 The Query Game
The Query Game has two goals. First, the agents learn and name discrimination
meanings. Second, it should give the agents information that allows the agents
to make decisions about how they should act in the world. The Query Game is
inspired by the variation of the Guessing Game that was used in the Talking Heads
experiment [11]. For brevity, Guessing Game refers to this variation in the rest of
this section. The Guessing Game is designed so that a language for discriminating
shapes on a whiteboard emerges in the agent society. Likewise, the Query Game
is designed so that a language can emerge for discriminating between places in the
environment. In both games the discrimination is based on discrimination trees.
The trees are grown and words for nodes in the tree (categorisers) are learned by
playing the game repeatedly. 4
4What objects are discriminated and how the discrimination is done is implementation-specific.
Both games can be implemented to discriminate different kinds of objects and using other cate-
gorisation methods than the discrimination tree.
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Part of the framework provided by a language game is an assumption about what
the communication is about. In the Guessing Game it is assumed that a word is used
to discriminate an object from all other objects in the context of a game round. In
the Query Game the words are assumed to refer to a route that an agent is planning
to take. As a result of this assumption the agents get information from the Query
Game they can use to reason how well their route plans fit together.
The Query Game gets its name from how it is played. When an agent gets an order
to fetch an item, it will plan a route to the shelf that contains it (2. step of the
basic behaviour, Section 4.2.1). To determine whether a route is free, the agent
will make a query to all the other agents by playing the Query Game. First, it will
select a place meaning and a discrimination meaning that distinguish the route. The
meanings are translated into words, which are broadcast to the other agents. The
other agents interpret the words and guess what place is meant by them. If any of
the other agents think that it is in the place, or that the place is on its route, it can
object. If any agent objects, the querying agent will conclude that the route is not
free. Otherwise, the route is assumed to be free.
As an alternative to the querying method, a solution was considered where an agent
would privately decide its route and then broadcast its decision. The drawback of
this is that the agents get the information they need for decision making spread over
time. Therefore they have to keep track of what each other agent has broadcast.
The query method was designed to give the agents all the information they need
at the time of the decision, so that they wouldn’t have to maintain models about
which places are or aren’t free.
The practicality of the information conveyed in the Query Game is dependent on
which place and discrimination meanings are chosen. The place meaning is used to
determine the context of the game. Given the context, the discrimination meaning
is used to discriminate cells that are on the route from the other cells in the context.
For selecting and using the meanings new methods are introduced. Selecting and
using the place meaning is discussed in the next section. After that, selecting and
using the discrimination meaning is discussed. For now it suffices to know, that the
meanings are chosen in a way, that allows the agents to communicate about a route.
The Query Game is played in two parts. Part 1 is used to learn discrimination
meanings, and for choosing a route to an agents destination. Part 2 is used to
update lexicons. Below is the script for part 1 with A as the speaker. Before the
game starts A calculates the two shortest routes to its destination (see Section 4.2.2
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for full details). The subject of the first query made is the shortest of these two
routes.
1. A selects a place meaning and a discrimination meaning for the route. If no
place meaning exists on the route, the game ends. If no suitable discrimination
meaning exists, the game ends, and the agent grows one of its discrimination
trees.
2. A translates the meanings to words and broadcasts them to all other agents.
If no word exist for the discrimination meaning, one is generated randomly.
3. The other agents interpret the words and guess which cells on the map they
refer to.
4. If an agent thinks that at least one of the cells is on its current route, it will
object.
If no one objected, A will assume that the route was free and chooses it. If someone
objected, A will make another query, where the subject is the second, longer route.
If no one objects, the second route is chosen. Otherwise one of the two routes is
chosen randomly. In case the other agents don’t know the words that were broadcast,
they will simply stay silent.
Part 2 is played when two agents collide. As was with the Place Game, the agent
that has to give way initialises the game, because only it detects that something
went wrong. The agent initialises the game only in the case that it is currently
in a cell, that corresponds to the place and discrimination meanings it used the
last time it acted as the speaker in part 1 of the game. In other words, a collision
happened even though this place was communicated about. There are two reasons
why this might happen. First, the communication might have been misunderstood.
Second, neither route considered by the speaker was free. In either case, this is a
good opportunity for the agents to align their lexicons. The script for the second
part with A as the speaker and B as the hearer is as follows:
35
1. A utters the word for the discrimination meaning it used in part 1.
2. B checks whether the cell it is in corresponds to the place and discrimination
meanings it used the last time it acted as the speaker. If not the game ends.
3. B updates the score for the association between the discrimination meaning it
last used acting as the speaker in part 1 and the uttered word (see Section 2.5.2
for details).
B has to check if the place corresponds to the last place it discriminated, because
it has to ensure that the updated discrimination meaning is the one it uses to
discriminate its current place on the map. Alternatively the agents could keep
track of which discrimination meanings they have used for different parts of the
environment, but for simplicity’s sake the former option was used.
6.3.1 Selecting the place meaning
The selected place meaning is used for deriving the context for the Query Game from
an agent’s internal model, or map, of the environment. This is required, because in
the Query Game the agents communicate about their future plans. More precisely,
the agents communicate about places where they are going to be at some point in
the future and therefore might not be currently perceiving these places.
For determining the context, the agents use place meanings and importance values
learned from the Place Game. When an agent makes a query on a route, for each
cell in the route it checks which place meaning the cell corresponds to and what
the importance value of that place meaning is. The place meaning with the highest
absolute importance value is chosen to determine the context for the Query Game.
Absolute value is used, because an importance value can be positive or negative. In
the experiments of this thesis the agents only learn negative values. Choosing the
place meaning this way corresponds to the agent asking itself what kind of a place
on my route affects my performance the most.
Once the place meaning has been chosen, all the cells corresponding to it are collected
from the map. These cells are the objects that constitute the context. Within the
context, each cell’s x- and y- coordinates are normalised, so that relative meanings
can be used (as discussed in Section 2.3).
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6.3.2 Selecting the discrimination meaning
After the context has been determined, a discrimination meaning is chosen to dis-
criminate the route in question. The topic of the game is the intersection of cells
on the route and cells in the context. As a result, the topic can be a set of mul-
tiple objects, instead of just one object (as discussed in Section 3.4). The goal of
discrimination is to distinguish the topic cells from the other cells in the context.
The discrimination meaning doesn’t necessarily distinguish the topic cells from the
other cells perfectly. For example in Figure 8, a perfect discrimination would be
impossible for either of the depicted routes, given that only one coordinate can be
used. In the implementation described here, the result of discrimination will be a
set of cells, that contains at least the whole topic set. In precise terms, the result
set is a superset of the topic set.
Figure 8: Two shortest routes shown for the agent next to the order centre. The
place meaning used to define context is shown on the bottom right. The context
comprises of the cells outlined with a dotted line. The topic cells have been outlined
with a solid line for both routes.
To make a discrimination, an agent has to choose which feature to use and which
level of the discrimination tree to use. The level of the tree can be thought of as
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the accuracy of the discrimination. To illustrate, the cells in the context of Figure 8
have the following x-coordinates when normalised: 0.0, 0.3, 0.7, 1.0 (values have
been rounded). The cells in the longer route on the left, outlined with blue have
x-coordinate 0.3. The value falls in to the range of [0-0.5]c and its child [0.25-0.5]c.
Even further, due to how the discrimination tree is structured, an arbitrary number
of levels can be added to the tree that all would have a categoriser containing 0.3.
The further down the tree is travelled, the smaller, more accurate area is defined
around the value, possibly defining a smaller result set. Using the categoriser [0-0.5]c
would define a result set with all the cells, whose x-coordinate is 0 or 0.3. Categoriser
[0.25-0.5]c would define a smaller set, with only the cells, whose x-coordinate is 0.3.
In the Guessing Game the level is chosen by travelling down the tree and selecting
the first categoriser that only contains the topic object. Thus, the least accurate
level is chosen that can unambiguously discriminate the object. In the Query Game
this method has been modified to deal with a result set that can contain non-topic
objects. The categoriser is chosen, that makes the result set smallest (and still
contains the whole topic set). If several such categorisers exist, the one with the
largest range is chosen. In other words, the agents use the least accurate categoriser
that defines the smallest result set. See Figure 9 for an example of the discrimination
process.
The feature selection is solved in the Guessing Game by gathering the categoris-
ers for each feature, that can unambiguously discriminate the topic. Then the
categoriser with the highest score is selected. In another manifestation of the Talk-
ing Heads Experiment, an alternative method is used to select a feature utilising
saliency [5]. Saliency is defined as the distance to the closest value in the con-
text. So if fi is the value of a feature for object i and C is the context, saliency is
argminj distance(fi, fj), where j ∈ C, j 6= i. The most salient feature is selected.
Neither of these ways to select the feature is applicable in the warehouse scenario,
because the practicality of the discrimination is dependent on the current situation,
not previous success or saliency. Instead, option-based discrimination is used (see
Section 3.4). The goal of the Query Game is to help the agent to make a choice
between two options, which are the two shortest routes. Therefore, the agent should
perform the discrimination in a way, that distinguishes the routes from from each
other. A discrimination that doesn’t distinguish the two routes would be less helpful
in decision making.
Let’s examine the longer route in Figure 8. The cells outlined by blue on the left
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[0­1]
[0­0.5] [0.5­1]
[0­0.25] [0.25­0­5]
[0.25­0.375] [0.375­0.5]
1. {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.7}
2. {0.3, 0.4. 0.5}
3. {0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
4. {0.3}
*
*
*
Figure 9: The discrimination process shown for topic set {0.3}. The result set
for each level is shown on the left, containing the whole context on the first level.
Traveling down the tree, a categoriser that contains the whole topic set is chosen
(marked with an asterix). With topic set {0.3} the categoriser on level 4 is chosen, as
it achieves an unambiguous discrimination. With topic set {0.3, 0.4}, the categoriser
on level 2 would be chosen, because there are no categorisers below it that contain
the topic set and make the result set smaller. In this case, a perfect discrimination
can’t be achieved and the final result set contains a value that isn’t in the topic set.
can be discriminated using the first level of the discrimination tree for both x- or y-
coordinate. For x-coordinate, the categoriser would be [0-0.5]x and for y-coordinate
[0.5-1]y. Both of the categorisers would define a result of the same size. 5 However,
only the x-coordinate distinguishes the route’s from each other and is therefore
selected.
In case an agent doesn’t have a categoriser that can discriminate the routes in the
first step of part 1 of the Query Game, it will grow one of its discrimination trees.
The agent gathers all the leaf nodes from all of its trees and it checks if some leaf
node could be split to acquire a categoriser that can discriminate the routes. If such
a leaf is found, it is grown. Otherwise a random leaf is grown.
5Of course in this case the x-coordinate could be categorised more accurately, but this is not
the case in all situations, and the agent might not have grown the tree that far.
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The methods introduced above for feature and level selection are just one possible
implementation. They have been designed so that in most cases agents with similar
behaviour will discriminate the same places similarly. Therefore, when two agents
collide and play the second part of the Query Game, they are likely to use the same
discrimination meaning. Consequently the agents can use a simple lexicon, where
they only update the score of one meaning-word pair per game. If the agents would
regularly discriminate the same place in different ways, either the agents would have
to be able to reason about how the others discriminate, or the lexicon (or its update
scheme) would have to be changed to deal with it.
The discrimination method proposed here rests on the assumption that discriminat-
ing options from each other will eventually refine the discrimination accuracy to a
sufficient level. This holds true in the warehouse environment, but might not always
be the case. Imagine for example an environment with four "corridors" in a row.
One of an agent’s options is always either the first or second "corridor" from the left.
The other one is always either the first or second "corridor" from the right. Hence,
the options can always be discriminated from each other with the second level of a
discrimination tree, i.e. with "left" and "right". An agent will never develop more
accurate concepts like "very left" and "slightly left", although they might provide a
more practical level of communication. Possible solutions for this are learning the
correct discrimination accuracy through experience, or having the ability to reason
about what level of accuracy is practical.
6.3.3 Example rounds
The first two examples are of part 1 of the Query Game, where the agent in Figure 10
is making a query. This agent is noted with A.
Example 1, part 1 success
1. A selects the place and discrimination meanings as seen in Figure 10.
2. A translates the place meaning into mamebo and discrimination meaning into
fomodu and broadcasts them.
3. All other agents interpret the words correctly.
4. The agent directly below the querying agent sees that its path crosses the cells
defined by the meanings and answers no.
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Figure 10: An example situation where the agent next to the order centre is making
a query about the route on the right. The cells defined by the place meaning shown
on the right and categoriser [0.5-0.75]x are outlined with a dotted line.
As an agent answered no to the query, the querying agent will next make a query
for the left route in the same way. If the other agents interpret the query correctly
again, they won’t answer and the querying agent will choose the left route.
Example 2, part 1 failure
1. A selects the place and discrimination meanings as seen in Figure 10.
2. A translates the place meaning into mamebo and the discrimination meaning
into fomodu and broadcasts them.
3. The agent directly below the querying agent misinterprets the words.
4. No agent answers the query.
Now the querying agent assumes that the route is free and will select it. This leads
to a collision as seen in Figure 11. An example of a round of the part 2 of the Query
Game played as a consequence of the collision is given next. A is the agent that
made the query and B is the other agent.
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Figure 11: An example situation with a collision.
Example 3, part 2
1. A utters fomodu, which was the word for the discrimination meaning in part
1.
2. B sees that it is in a cell currently that corresponds to the meanings it last
used as the speaker in part 1.
3. B updates the association between the word A uttered and the discrimination
it used the last time.
There are two possibilities for the discrimination meaning B updates in this round,
which are [0.5-1]x and [0.5-0.75]x. The longer the simulation goes on, the higher the
chance is that an agent uses the latter discrimination meaning, because it is accurate
enough to discriminate between the two rightmost "corridors" between the shelves.
6.3.4 Experiments
These experiments were run with an agent society playing both the Place Game
and the Query Game. The main goal was to see if utilising the language for route
selection helps the agents deliver more items, i.e. perform better, compared to
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the basic behaviour with the random route selection scheme and no language. 100
simulations with 100 000 time steps and 6 agents were run. The reported values
are simulation run averages. The same warehouse environment was used as in the
previous experiments in Section 5 and Section 6.2.2.
Performance An increase in performance can be observed in Table 3, as the agents
start utilising language by playing the Query Game. There is an 9.3% increase in
deliveries made with language compared to no communication, showing that the
agents can utilise language in a practical way.
Measurement Random scheme Language
Deliveries 4414± 5 4825± 6
Collisions 3670± 13 2219± 15
Table 3: Average deliveries made and times collided for an agent during a single
simulation run. The random scheme values are from Section 5.
Coherency For the x-axis discrimination meanings [0-0.25]x, [0.25-0.5]x, [0.5-0.75]x,
and [0.75-1]x all agents use the same word by the end of all runs. The same goes
for y-axis discrimination meanings [0-0.5]y, [0.5-1]y. A language emerges for these
discrimination meanings, because the agents use them in 99.0% of cases in the given
warehouse environment. The agents use more accurate discrimination meanings for
x, because there are more vertical than horizontal shelf rows. For other discrimina-
tion meanings a coherent language doesn’t emerge.
It is important to note that the amount of agents translating a meaning to the
same word doesn’t tell the whole story of the coherence of the language. Because
the lexicon supports synonymy, agents using a different word might still understand
each other. In this experiment, however, synonymy seems to be rare. Only in 0.6% of
the times when a hearer interpreted the speaker’s word for a discrimination meaning
correctly, the hearer would have used a different word than the speaker.
To measure the success of the agents’ communication, two definitions are made for
when a game is successful. The definitions are called partial and complete success.
When an agent makes a query, i.e. plays part 1 of the Query Game, it broadcasts
two words to the other agents. The game is partially successful if at least one of the
hearers interprets the two words as the meanings intended by the speaker. Complete
success is reached if all hearers interpret the words as the intended meanings. Only
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part 1 of the Query Game is considered, because that is when the agents communi-
cate and interpret the information needed to make decisions. Therefore the agents’
performance is directly tied to how well they understand each other in part 1.
Performance w.r.t. language emergence In Figure 12 it can be seen that the
average delivery time decreases as the language emerges. Interestingly, most of the
decrease in delivery time has already happened when complete success is only around
30%. This indicates that a language can become practical early in its development,
even if it is incoherent in the society as a whole.
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Figure 12: Showing the average delivery time of deliveries made by an agent with
and without language. Also showing the complete and partial success ratios of
language games played. All curves are smoothed over the last 1000 time steps.
Emergence speed Figure 13 gives an idea of how fast a coherent language emerges
w.r.t. game rounds played. For partial success, an 80% success ratio is reached
around around 1300 games. For complete success 80% is reached around 4800 games.
Environment’s effect How much the language affects performance is largely dic-
tated by the environment. To investigate this a 100 simulations were run, where
the shelf rows were extended to be double the length of the default layout. Oth-
erwise this extended setup was identical to the described Query Game setup. In
the extended setup, there is a larger punishment for a collision between the shelves,
because an agent has to back away longer on average, than in the Query Game
setup. The relative increase in deliveries made is larger for the extended, being
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Figure 13: Showing partial and complete success ratios w.r.t games played. The
ratios are smoothed over the last 100 games played.
10.4%, compared to the 9.3% for Query Game setup mentioned above.
6.3.5 Discussion
The 9.3% increase in deliveries made with language might seem quite small given
the amount of work that went into designing and implementing the agents’ abilities
and the language games. Of course this increase is only specific to the presented
implementation of the warehouse and the agents might benefit from language more
in other settings as was seen in the experiment with extended shelf rows.
Unfortunately the language emerges slowly even in the simple simulation environ-
ment, which might limit the possible real life applications of the presented methods.
However, no downside was detected to using language in the early learning phase and
the language started benefiting the society quite early in its development. Also the
methods used for language emergence here weren’t really designed with the optimal
emergence speed in mind, so there are probably many ways in which the emergence
could be sped up.
6.4 Summary
The language games and agent abilities used for language emergence have now been
implemented and the resulting language was shown to be practical. By playing the
Place game the agents learn a language for different types of places and with goal
monitoring the importance of these place types. Utilising the importance values
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learned alongside the Place Game the agents were able to determine the context for
the Query game in a useful way. Furthermore, with option-based discrimination the
agents learned to discriminate places in a meaningful way.
7 Experiments on the language
Now that a society where a practical language can emerge has been implemented,
it is easy to create new experiments exploring different aspects of the language
and its emergence. This section consists of three such experiments, starting with
an experiment exploring how the language could be used to learn to conceptualise
route options. In the second experiment the language is tested against a reason-
able predetermined behaviour that doesn’t utilise language, but still manages to
eliminate collisions. The third experiment explores if the agents can transfer their
discrimination meanings to a new environment.
7.1 Route conceptualisation experiment
An essential part of the agents’ behaviour is computing the two shortest routes, as
they provide the options that the agents have a choice over. In the experiments
above, the agents had a predetermined way of doing this. First they computed the
shortest route. Then they computed the second route by assuming that the last
cell in the first route is blocked. Although this way of computing the routes worked
in the default warehouse environment, it doesn’t translate well to other kinds of
environments. In this section an alternative method is investigated that allows an
agent to learn to conceptualise routes based on its experiences. The new method
takes advantage of the agent’s already learned importance values and lexicon.
For these experiments the agents are moved to a new environment depicted in Fig-
ure 14. This new warehouse also stores beer, which the agents are not allowed
to handle. The agents operate as before, fetching items from the shelves. As the
shelves are now placed in a way that leaves open room in front of them, the old way
of calculating the routes does not produce meaningful options anymore. Also the
places where collisions are most harmful are now in the middle of the route, instead
of at the end. In the environment there are choices of route also when returning
from a shelf to the action centre. The agents utilise the Query Game for this choice
as well.
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Figure 14: A warehouse environment that stores beer.
The new route conceptualisation method works as follows:
1. The shortest route is computed.
2. The most important place from this route is determined using the importance
values.
3. The second route is calculated assuming that the cells corresponding to the
most important place on the shortest route are blocked.
This route conceptualisation method is closely tied to how the Query Game is im-
plemented. In the Query Game the agents discriminate a route based on the most
important place meaning on it. Therefore the agents use the same place meaning
to both conceptualise and communicate about their routes.
Using only importance values for the route conceptualisation might lead to situa-
tions where the agents use meanings they can’t communicate to others. Thus score
filtering is introduced, which is a method that allows the emerged language to affect
what meanings the agents use for the route conceptualisation. When an agent is
determining the most important meaning on a route, it will only use meanings that
have a high score in the lexicon. More precisely, a meaning is only considered if
47
s ≥ F , where s is the highest score of all meaning-word pairs containing the mean-
ing in question and F is the filtering threshold. If s < F , the meaning is not used.
In this thesis F = 0.5, which means that a meaning is used for route conceptual-
isation if an agents hears the same word for the meaning in 50% of Place Games.
Preliminary tests indicated that this value was best for performance out of values
0.1, 0.2 . . . 1.0 in the experiment environment.
Again, the whole system is not implemented right away. First, agents without
route conceptualisation or language are tested to set a baseline. Second, the route
conceptualisation is implemented and tested without language games to investigate
if route conceptualisation alone is already beneficial to the agents. Finally, route
conceptualisation is used and language games are played to see how well the route
conceptualisation works together with language.
An agent without route conceptualisation behaves differently when a collision hap-
pens than previously described. Above the agents gave way by taking random steps
towards the action centre until the chosen route was clear again. An agent can’t
behave this way, unless it has a concept of what its route is. Instead an agent with-
out route conceptualisation will calculate a new route when it collides without any
constriction on having to return to the old route. If a new route can’t be calculated,
it will give way until any route to the destination can be found again.
The experiments are divided into post- and pre-language setups. With the post-
language setup, the route conceptualisation is tested before the agents utilise lan-
guage and with the pre-language setup, utilising route conceptualisation together
with language is tested.
As before all simulations settings are run 100 times, and the run averages are re-
ported. Each simulation run consists of 100 000 time steps and has 4 agents.
7.1.1 Pre-language setup results
The aim of this experiment setup is to analyse how the agents conceptualise their
routes and to find out whether route conceptualisation is already beneficial to the
agents before language is used. To this end simulations are run with agents with and
without route conceptualisation. With route conceptualisation the agents choose
their route randomly between the two shortest options.
It is observed that the implemented route conceptualisation doesn’t benefit the
agents without language. The average amount of deliveries an agent makes without
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route conceptualisation is 2322± 2 and with route conceptualisation 2300± 3. The
values are presented with 99% confidence intervals.
Figure 15 shows how the agents tend to conceptualise routes. The left meaning is
used 85% and the right 7% of the time. These two meanings are the top two most
important place meanings, because the agents might end up backing through the
whole "corridor" if a collision happens in one of them.
Figure 15: Two most used meanings to conceptualise a route without score filtering.
7.1.2 Post-language setup results
In this setup the agents play the Place and Query games and use route conceptualisa-
tion. These experiments have two goals. First, to test if the route conceptualisation
works together with language. Second, to see whether the agents can use score
filtering to alter their route conceptualisation in such a way that results in more
deliveries. The delivery amounts are presented with 99% confidence intervals.
Without score filtering an agent makes 2453 ± 8 deliveries, which is a 5.5% im-
provement over the pre-language setup. However, the most used meaning for route
conceptualisation is the first one in Figure 15. This meaning is learned in asymmet-
ric situations where the speaker’s and hearer’s perception of the place differs and
therefore can’t have a coherent word in the agent society.
With score filtering an agent makes 2531±2 deliveries, improving the result without
score filtering by 3.2%. The total improvement over the pre-language setup is 9.0%.
With score filtering the most used route conceptualisation meaning is the right one
in Figure 15. For this meaning all agents use the same word by the end of all runs.
The difference in the conceptualisation meanings used with and without score fil-
tering is reflected in the complete success ratio shown in Figure 16. Because there
is no coherent language for the most used place meaning without score filtering, the
success ratio stays low the whole run. With score filtering the agents are able to
communicate successfully.
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Figure 16: Complete success ratio with and without filtering. Only showing the first
20 000 time steps, after which the curves stagnate.
7.1.3 Discussion
Two new abilities, route conceptualisation and score filtering, were introduced for the
agents. They were successfully implemented in the agents, leading to improvements
in performance.
Although route conceptualisation alone without language didn’t prove to be benefi-
cial in the experiment environment presented here, it is conceivable that the outcome
could be different depending on the environment. Also route conceptualisation could
be generalised to option conceptualisation, meaning the agents could learn to con-
ceptualise all kinds of options for themselves through experience, not just different
routes.
An interesting interaction was seen in these experiments between language and how
the agents conceptualise the world. It seems logical, that if the agents communicate
about the world, they need to conceptualise it in a way that can be communicated.
In other words limitations in the language impose requirements on the world con-
ceptualisation.
7.2 Circling behaviour experiment
The goal of these experiments is to investigate the agents’ performance against a
predetermined behaviour designed to minimise collisions. The same environment
from the above section is used (see Figure 14). With the predetermined behaviour,
when an agent goes to a shelf, it will always use the outer "corridor". So if the
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shelf is on the left, the agent uses the left "corridor", and when the shelf is on the
right, the right "corridor" is used. When an agent returns from the shelf to the
action centre, it will use the inner "corridor". With this behaviour collisions in the
"corridors" are eliminated, because all the agents move in the same direction in all
of them. As the behaviour results in the agents going in circles, it is referred to
as circling behaviour. As the routes are predetermined with circling behaviour, the
agents do not use language.
Simulations were run for 2, 3, 4, and 5 agents. With each amount of agents 100
simulations with 100 000 time steps were run. The reported values are run averages.
7.2.1 Results
In Figure 17 it can be observed that if the amount of agents is 3 or less, the language
using agents perform better than agents with circling behaviour. However, with 4
or more agents circling behaviour has better performance. It seems that there is a
turning point between 3 and 4 agents, and the difference between the behaviours
grows the further away the amount of agents is from this point. It can also be seen
that the amount of deliveries made decreases as the amount of agents increases.
This effect is very slight with circling behaviour, but with language behaviour it can
be clearly seen in the figure.
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Figure 17: The average amount of deliveries an agent makes in different agent
societies.
51
The reason for the larger decline in deliveries made with language behaviour can be
seen in Figure 18. As the amount of agents increases, more collisions happen in the
"corridors".
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Figure 18: Collision heat maps for societies with different amounts of agents and
language behaviour.
7.2.2 Discussion
In the previous experiments, it was seen that at least in some cases language should
affect conceptualisation. In these experiments a similar relationship is seen between
the environment and behaviour. It was seen that between two behaviour models,
one utilising language and the other the programmer’s knowledge and understanding
of the environment, neither is strictly better in all cases. Of course if the language
and its usage were implemented differently, the circling behaviour might emerge as
a consequence of the language as well.
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Which behaviour model performs better was observed to depend on at least one
environment variable, i.e. the amount of agents. When there are 3 or less agents,
the language utilising agents are able to often pick the shorter route to the shelves
and back. With more agents the "corridors" are occupied more frequently, and the
language utilising agents are not able to utilise the shorter route frequently enough
to outperform the circling behaviour. With circling behaviour the agents always
use the longer route when going to a shelf, and the shorter route when going to
the action centre. Although with circling behaviour the agents use the longer route
50% of the time, the decrease in performance due to this is offset by the fact that
collisions are eliminated. Other environment variables, such as the layout, are also
likely to have different effects on different behaviour models.
The above highlights the importance of not only learning what to communicate, but
also how to behave and when to communicate. If the agents are able to learn different
behaviours, there might be situations where communication through language is
unnecessary. Language learning could for example be combined with reinforcement
learning, which is a well established field for learning behaviour. In reinforcement
learning agents learn through experience to take actions in order to maximise the
reward they gain [24].
The importance of learning when to communicate was also detected in some early
experiments that are not reported in this thesis. In the experiments, the agents
managed to learn a coherent language, and used it successfully to avoid collisions.
Regardless, the amount of deliveries made actually decreased. The reason was that
in avoiding collisions, the agents had to take longer paths, which was worse on
average than just risking the collision. In this case it would have been better to
choose not to communicate at all.
Improvements to the language might make language utilising agents perform bet-
ter or as well as agents with circling behaviour with all agent amounts. A major
limitation in the current implementation is, that the agents do not have any way
to understand or communicate their movement direction in the "corridors". If two
agents are travelling in the same direction in the same "corridor", there is no danger
of collision between them.
The more tools the agents have for understanding the world, the more potential
language also has. Increased complexity in conceptualising the world might increase
the required complexity of the language, making language emergence more difficult.
However increased "cognitive" abilities might also make language emergence easier,
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if the agents are able to make better inferences on what another agent might be
trying to say. For example, Steels and Loetzsch [23] showed that understanding
other agent’s visual perspective can be beneficial for language emergence.
7.3 Meaning transfer experiment
The reason for learning general meanings for places and coordinates instead of learn-
ing names for specific places in the environment, was that they can be utilised when
the environment changes. To test this, the agents first learn a language in a training
environment, after which they are moved to a testing environment. See Figure 19
for the environments.
Figure 19: The training environment on the left and the testing environment on the
right.
The importance of normalising the coordinates within the context now becomes
clear. The absolute distance between the "corridors" in the training and testing
environments is different. In the training environment, the absolute range between
the leftmost and rightmost "corridors" is also larger. Normalisation allows the agents
to use the same meanings in both environments.
Simulations were run with 0, 5000, 20 000, and 50 000 time steps in the training
environment, before the society of 4 agents was moved to the testing environment.
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The testing environment was run for 20 000 time steps in all cases. 100 simulations
were run for each training step amount, and the averages from the testing envi-
ronment are reported. Therefore, for example the deliveries made in the training
environment do not count towards the reported amount of deliveries.
7.3.1 Results
The amount of deliveries with 0 training steps is 1037± 2 and with 50 000 training
steps 1042 ± 2 (shown with 99% confidence intervals). Surprisingly training before
the testing environment doesn’t result in a signifigant increase in deliveries made.
Figure 20 shows how fast a language emerges in the testing environment with differ-
ent amounts of training steps in the training environment. A noticeable difference
can be observed in the lines for 0, 5000, and 10 000 training steps until they converge
around 13 000 time steps. With 10 0000, 20 000, and 50 000 training steps a differ-
ence can be seen only in the very beginning, after which the lines converge around
2000 time steps. Overall it can be seen that more training steps in the training
environment results in faster language emergence.
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Figure 20: Complete success ratios in the testing environment for agent societies
with different amounts of training steps. The lines are smoothed over 1000 time
steps.
Only discrimination meanings transfer from the training environment, as the "corri-
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dors" are different in the environments. To analyse how well they transfer, part 1 of
the Query game (see Section 6.3) is inspected. In it the speaker utters a word for a
place meaning, and another word for a discrimination meaning. Table 4 shows that
with 0 training steps, most failures are caused by misinterpretation of the discrim-
ination word. As the amount of training steps increases, less games fail because of
the discrimination word, and a higher and higher portion of failures are caused by
misinterpretation of the place word. With 50 000 steps the agents have a coherent
language for the discrimination meanings, which transfers perfectly to the testing
environment. The language in the testing environment emerges fast, because the
agents only need to learn a place meaning.
Misinterpretation % for
Training steps Discrimination word Place word Failed games
0 95.0% 12.4% 668
5000 78.6% 27.5% 199
10 000 32.9% 68.7% 52
20 000 0.5% 99.6% 48
50 000 0.0% 100.0% 45
Table 4: Percentage of failed games where at least one agent misinterpreted the
discrimination or place word. Also showing the total amount of failed games.
7.3.2 Discussion
These experiments show that at least the discrimination meanings can be transferred
to new environments. The author sees no reason why place meanings wouldn’t
transfer similarly. However, some problems might emerge regarding the importance
values that are associated with the place meanings. A place meaning that has been
learned to be important in an old environment might not be important in the new
environment and vice versa.
Learning the discrimination meanings in the training environment didn’t improve
performance in any significant manner in the testing environment, because the lan-
guage emerges so quickly from scratch. In a situation where the language emergence
is slower the outcome would probably be different. Possible causes for a slower lan-
guage emergence include a more complex language, larger society, and meanings
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that are harder to learn.
7.4 Summary
Three experiments were conducted to explore different aspects of the language. In
the route conceptualisation experiment it was shown how the agents could utilise
their learned importance values to conceptualise their route options. Also with
score filtering the importance of feedback from the language into how the agents
conceptualise the world was shown.
The circling behaviour experiment showcased the importance of taking a holistic
view to language learning. When and what the agents should communicate about
depends on the environment and the behaviour of the agents.
The meaning transfer experiment showed that the agents can successfully transfer
discrimination meanings into new environments. However, no significant improve-
ment was detected in performance in this particular experiment setting, although
improvements were seen in language emergence speed.
8 Related work
Language games are a popular tool for researching emergent communication amongst
computational agents [25]. They are commonly used to analyse different emergence
mechanisms, meaning and lexicon structures, and aspects of language. For example,
Nevens and Spranger [26] investigate tutor feedback in language learning. In their
experiments a tutor agent is teaching a language to a learning agent. The tutor
can give feedback on a language game by pointing, which speeds up the learning.
Lazaridou et al. [27] use neural networks as implicit meaning structures. Their agents
play a language game where the agents see two images, one of which is the topic.
The speaker uses a neural network to map the topic (given the context) to a symbol
in the agents’ vocabulary. The hearer uses a neural network to map the symbol
and the context to one of the two images, guessing which is the topic. Cuskley et
al. [28] study dynamics of regularity and irregularity in language systems. Natural
language has many regular rules, which have irregular exceptions. For instance, the
past tense for preach is preached (regular) and for teach is taught (irregular).
In contrast the focus of the work presented here is on emergence of language that can
be used as a tool for some purpose. The properties of the language, its emergence,
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and even communication success are secondary to whether the agents can improve
their performance (see Section 3).
Emergent communication research is not limited to language games. E.g. in the
experiments of Mordatch and Abbeel [3], the agents utter communication symbols
at each time step. The agents don’t participate in any formal language games
and the uttered symbols are only part of what an agent can observe about its
environment. Although goal monitoring and option-based discrimination were used
alongside language games in this thesis, they are not dependent on language games.
It could be argued, that Mordacth and Abbeel use a form of goal monitoring, as
their agents learn a language based on a shared reward, which reflects how well the
whole society is performing.
In recent years neural networks have been popular in emergent communication re-
search [2, 3, 4, 29, 27, 30]. Their black box nature makes it hard to analyse what kind
of meanings the agents learn, and how they are associated with verbal utterances.
Also their training is slow and requires a lot of data. Neural networks were not used
here, because for the purposes of this thesis, simpler, explicit models seemed more
appropriate. The focus of the research presented here is not on the language models
themselves, but the introduced methods that can be used to ground the language
models in practicality. However, these methods are not tied to the language models
used in this thesis, and could be used with other models like neural networks as well.
For more information on communication emergence amongst computational agents,
the reader is guided to the surveys by Kirby [31] and Wagner [32].
9 Final words
9.1 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to investigate how language could be grounded in practi-
cality in a society of agents playing language games. The thesis started with a look
into the problem of grounding language in perception, as it would serve as a basis
for practicality grounding.
The contributions of this thesis began by extending the problem of grounding lan-
guage in perception to include grounding in practicality. The main idea behind
practicality grounding is that the needs of the agents should guide what kind of
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a language emerges and how it is used. To enable grounding language in practi-
cality three novel methods were introduced: goal monitoring, using importance to
determine a game’s context, and option-based discrimination.
To facilitate emergence of the language two new language games were introduced:
the Place Game and the Query Game. These games were designed for learning
place and discrimination meanings and words for them. The methods for grounding
language in practicality were used to guide what the agents communicate in the
Query Game, so that they could share useful information with each other.
Empirical experiments were conducted in a simulated warehouse environment, where
the agents’ task was to fetch items from shelves. The experiments showed that a lan-
guage that improves the agents’ performance, i.e. a practical language, can emerge
as a consequence of the language games and methods introduced in this thesis.
Additional experiments were run to investigate various aspects of the language.
The work presented here focuses on very elementary aspects of grounding language
in practicality. The author hopes that the rudimentary methods and experiments
presented here could serve as a starting point and inspiration for others to continue
the research.
9.2 Future work
Learning language in a setting where the agents act to perform tasks or reach goals
means that the language is tied to everything the agents do or reason about. This
raises several questions, such as when should an agent communicate [33]. Some of
the possible directions of future research are discussed here.
This thesis was based on early language game research. Since then the field has
moved on and several developments have happened that could be revisited from prac-
ticality’s perspective. These include using grammar [34] and semiotic networks [35].
In the experiments the agents’ behaviour and language was based on a 2D map.
Although the agents had the same map of the environment, the presented methods
should work in theory even if each agent built its own map. Because of how the
context is derived from the map and normalised, the agents don’t need a common
origin for their personal maps. Therefore the research conducted here might be
relatively easily continued on real robots utilising simultaneous localization and
mapping (SLAM) [36]. In SLAM agents simultaneously build a map of an unknown
environment and track their location in it.
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Computer simulations have been used to research language emergence not only in
computational agents, but humans as well [37]. In the author’s mind it would be
fairly safe to state that humans use language for practical purposes, and so simula-
tions investigating practical language emergence could be helpful in understanding
the evolution of human language.
Another interesting direction to take would be investigating the possibilities of com-
putational creativity for language emergence. Colton andWiggins [38] define compu-
tational creativity research as: "The philosophy, science and engineering of compu-
tational systems which, by taking on particular responsibilities, exhibit behaviours
that unbiased observers would deem to be creative." In the field of computational
creativity language games have been used to evolution of language in creative do-
mains [39, 15, 40]. It would be interesting to apply computational creativity tech-
niques to the creation of language itself. For example, instead of randomly gen-
erating new words as was done in this thesis, the words could be created in some
meaningful way so that their form already communicates something.
The agents in this thesis don’t model each other’s "minds" in any way. Not only
could this kind of modelling be beneficial for cooperation between the agents in
general [8], but it could help language emergence. For example, understanding other
agents’ visual perspective of the environment can aid language emergence [23]. A
natural continuation for the work presented in this thesis would be modelling other
agents’ goals.
Combining reinforcement learning with language learning was already discussed in
Section 7.2. This is a promising direction for future research, as the goal of rein-
forcement learning and practical language is the same, i.e. learning to act better in
the world. The method for updating the importance values, which dictated what
the agents communicated about, was already inspired by a reinforcement learning
method called Q-learning [22].
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